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Abstract 
Climate change is a collective action problem that has often been analysed as a Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
States have an incentive to free ride on the efforts of others. Yet around the globe national and sub-
national governments are introducing regulatory measures to reduce emissions that can be fairly 
characterised as unilateral actions. The US and China, the world’s two largest emitters, are at the 
forefront. Indeed the evidence of states beginning to depart from business-as-usual behaviour raises 
the possibility that the characterizations of climate change as a Prisoner’s Dilemma may apply less 
strongly to the problem and that something else may be starting to happen. Accordingly, this paper 
considers: (i) to what extent nations are taking unilateral action to address climate change; and (ii) in 
the context of climate change, which is considered one of the greatest global collective action 
problems the world has faced, what are the possible economic explanations for nations to act in a 
unilateral fashion and what are the normative reasons for doing so. We justify regulatory unilateralism 
on economic, geopolitical and moral grounds, and argue that regulatory unilateralism may offer the 
best hope of triggering a race to cut emissions.  A race rather than prolonged negotiations is what is 
required at this moment in climate history. 
Policy Implications: 
 Need to gain a better understanding of the extent and depth of regulatory unilateral action on 
climate change being undertaken by all states at the national and sub-national levels. 
 Need to question whether the Prisoner’s Dilemma framework captures the real-world dynamics 
of the problem of climate change. 
 Be aware of the wide range of co-benefits from taking unilateral measures. These go beyond 
economic benefits to include, for example, the geopolitical benefit a state has from preserving the 
existing order and avoiding worst-case climate scenarios. 
 Unilateral measures should be chosen based on a country’s regulatory and innovation capabilities. 
 
Climate change is a collective action problem that has often been analysed as a Prisoner’s Dilemma 
(Soroos 1994; Gardiner S.M. 2001; Newberry 2011). Two decades of international negotiations have 
produced a climate regime that has had only modest impacts on mitigation (Downie, 2014). Given the 
strength of the free-rider problem it seems puzzling to consider, as this paper does, the case for 
‘regulatory unilateralism’ in the case of climate change.  Even if unilateralism turns out to be an 
improbable path to climate change mitigation it is worth being sure whether this is actually the case.  
Regulatory unilateralism in the context of climate change has not really been explored. Yet there is 
evidence that states have already taken actions on climate change that can be fairly characterized as 
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‘regulatory unilateralism’. Moreover, the level of this activity is greater than might be expected if the 
free rider logic that we described above were to hold tightly or if we were to assume that a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game perfectly characterized the climate change problem.  In other words, the evidence of 
states beginning to depart from business-as-usual behaviour raises the possibility that these 
characterizations may apply less strongly to the problem and that something else may be starting to 
happen.  
We analyse regulatory unilateralism in two ways.  We begin by considering the extent to which 
regulatory unilateralism is happening, especially in the US and China, and then shift to a possible 
economic explanation for why it might be happening. If this explanation is right it also offers a 
potential normative reason for acting unilaterally, assuming that, all other things being equal, acting 
to gain an economic benefit gives one a reason for so acting. From there we shift to considering the 
geopolitical and moral cases for regulatory unilateralism. Ours is an argument by convergence.  We 
find that there are economic, geopolitical and moral reasons for states to adopt policies of regulatory 
unilateralism.   
The next section provides a brief overview of what we mean by regulatory unilateralism. This is 
followed by a description of some of the unilateral actions being taken around the globe, with an 
emphasis on the US and China. The remaining sections then examine the arguments for regulatory 
unilateralism. 
Regulatory unilateralism and the structure of free-riding 
One can distinguish between different types of unilateral action.  For example, a state can act legally 
or illegally, or positively (the case of exceeding an agreed standard) or negatively (the case of doing 
less than an agreed standard). In the case of climate action we are interested in positive unilateralism, 
the case in which an actor introduces or adjusts standards, rules or a scheme of regulation 
independently of the actions of other actors, that action not being required under regulatory 
standards that are authoritative for the actor.  For an action to be unilateral it must be voluntary and 
independent of what another party may or may not do.  The motivations for unilateral action will vary. 
Economic self-interest, reputation, virtue may all motivate unilateral action but as long as an actor’s 
commitment is not contingent upon the action of others it is unilateral.   
Our arguments concerning regulatory unilateralism rest on a more detailed account of the structure 
of the free riding problem facing states in the case of climate change.  Where a state is contributing 
significantly to carbon emissions it is generating a negative externality for all other states and itself. It 
is a case of reciprocal and reflexive negative externalities (Drahos 2011). As the many volumes of IPCC 
reports make clear, over time any free riding benefits accruing to states are temporary and will be 
washed away.  Under this structure of reciprocal and reflexive but delayed negative externalities what 
behaviour do we observe by states? Put succinctly, states have entered into prolonged negotiations 
over the problem, but the outcomes of those negotiations have fallen well short of what is needed 
(UNEP 2013). The Paris Agreement is the latest iteration of this prolonged negotiating process. While 
it is rightly hailed as a milestone, it is important for our purposes to observe that the Paris Agreement 
is in essence a mix of mandatory proceduralism and sovereign discretion (UNFCCC 2015). States have 
obligations when it comes to the process of creating and submitting nationally determined 
contributions (see in particular Article 4), but they have sovereign discretion when it comes to the 
content of those plans. A state’s plans for peaking and reduction of emissions are a matter of national 
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determination (UNFCCC 2015).  The Paris Agreement urges and invites regulatory unilateralism.  A 
state in acting unilaterally contributes to a change in the structure of the free-riding problem because 
it reduces the risk of negative externalities for itself and other states and may sometimes generate 
positive externalities. 
If the Prisoner’s Dilemma characterization of the problem is correct then the Paris Agreement’s 
reliance on regulatory unilateralism is a profound misstep.  It is consistent with each state wanting 
other states to bear the burden of emissions reduction while it avoids the burden.  We have described 
the problem as a free-riding problem involving reciprocal and reflexive but delayed negative 
externalities. As the delayed externalities begin to arrive, thereby confirming much of the scientific 
work, states may well be changing their beliefs about the payoffs of unilateralism.  In particular they 
may be assessing how they can capture co-benefits through implementing unilateral measures.   
At this moment in time there is some indeterminacy about how to characterize the present approach 
of states.  A game theoretician could justifiably point to previous failures of the climate talks and say 
the Paris Agreement’s lack of mandatory emission targets is more evidence of payoff rankings by 
individual states that will see the worse possible outcome for all states.  We question this 
characterization and then develop an argument by convergence for unilateralism that is made up of 
explanatory and normative components i.e. there is an explanation for why states are changing their 
behaviour and that change in behaviour can be justified. 
Regulatory Unilateralism: is it happening? 
In the international climate change negotiations each major emitter can be seen as holding an 
emissions chip with which to bargain in return for concessions from other major emitters, much as 
states hold onto their high tariffs as bargaining chips in order to make sure that they have something 
to give up in exchange for other states doing the same.  There is some evidence that GATT tariff 
negotiations follow a reciprocity norm (Limao, 2006; Karacaovali and Limao, 2008).  Equally one might 
expect there to be very little unilateralism in the context of climate change. Aside from the loss of 
bargaining power in climate negotiations, a unilateral shift to renewables by a state might raise energy 
costs for its industries and risk its carbon intensive industries relocating to states of less stringent 
regulation (the carbon leakage problem). Yet there is evidence of significant unilateral activity by 
states going back a number of years.   
In order to determine whether regulatory unilateralism is happening it is necessary to first identify 
which countries have binding international obligations and which do not. Table 1 shows the top 12 
emitting countries in descending order of emissions. If we consider the EU a country for the purposes 
of this discussion, six of the 12 major emitters do not have internationally binding emissions targets. 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, which expired in 2012, only so-called Annex 1 countries assumed binding 
targets when they ratified the treaty. The US, which never ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and major 
developing countries, such as China and India, which are not Annex 1 countries, have never had 
internationally binding emissions targets. Hence, actions to reduce emissions, for example by the US 
or China, can be viewed as unilateral actions. 
Table 1 Major Emitters 
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China No Non-Annex 1 Yes e.g. emission targets and sub-
national emissions trading  
US No Annex I, but did 
not ratify Kyoto 
Yes e.g. emission targets and sub-
national emissions trading 
EU Yes Annex 1 Yes e.g. emission targets and 
European-wide emissions trading 
India No Non-Annex 1 Yes e.g. emission targets and 
renewable energy targets 
Russia Yes Annex 1 Yes e.g. emission targets and 
renewable energy targets 
Japan Yes Annex 1 Yes e.g. emission targets and sub-
national emissions trading 
Korea No Non-Annex 1 Yes e.g. emission targets and national 
emissions trading 
Canada Yes Annex 1 Yes e.g. emission targets and sub-
national carbon taxes 
Brazil No Non-Annex 1 Yes e.g. emission targets and national 
deforestation targets 
Indonesia No Non-Annex 1 Yes e.g. emission targets and national 
deforestation targets 
Australia Yes Annex 1 Yes e.g. emission targets and national 
emissions trading 
South Africa No Non-Annex 1 Yes e.g. emissions targets and a 
national carbon tax 
Source: Climate Action Tracker 
We begin with the actions of the US and China because together they contribute about 44 percent of 
global greenhouse gas emissions (the US 16 percent and China 28 percent) (Bi et al., 2014, p. 2). Both 
countries have historically been on opposing sides of the international climate negotiations and US 
political leaders have long refused to act without reciprocal actions by China and other large emitters, 
as epitomised by the 1997 Byrd-Hagel US Senate Resolution, which stated that the US should not be 
a party to any international agreement which did not mandate commensurate actions for developing 
countries (United States Senate, 1997). 
This is now changing. Regulatory unilateralism has, without any fanfare, been a feature of the Obama 
Administration. In 2009 it began negotiations with the major car manufacturers over fuel efficiency 
and carbon pollution standards, standards that eventually took on regulatory form for the entire US 
industry (The White House 2012). Important also has been the quiet, but large scale standard-setting 
exercises undertaken by different parts of the US Department of Energy aimed at improving energy 
efficiency and productivity, as well as ensuring that the US remains a central player in emerging clean 
energy technology markets (see, for example, Advance Manufacturing Office 2013). In 2013, President 
Obama outlined his Climate Action Plan to reduce emissions. The most far-reaching component is the 
Clean Power Plan, administered by the Environmental Protection Agency, which sets carbon pollution 
standards for existing power plants that are expected to reduce emissions from the power sector by 
30 percent by 2030 (The White House, 2013).  Other regulatory measures have focussed on energy 
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efficiency in the building sector and efforts to preserve existing forests to limit emissions from 
deforestation (The White House, 2013). 
At the sub-national level, almost 30 US states have climate action plans. The state level of energy 
planning in the US has also become increasingly active since 2000 with many state plans targeting the 
generation of electricity from renewables (National Association of State Energy Officials, 2013) 
California has put in place targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 – a target 
it is on track to meet – 40 percent below 1990 levels by 2030 and 80 percent below 1990 levels by 
2050 (Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., 2015). It is one of twenty states with state-wide 
emissions targets (C2ES, 2015). US states have also acted independently of the Federal Government 
to implement emissions trading schemes. For example, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, which 
commenced in 2009, is a regional emissions trading scheme covering nine states in the northeast of 
the US. In 2013, California also introduced an emissions trading scheme, which aims to link to similar 
schemes in Canadian provinces (IETA, 2015).  
China has also taken a unilateral path. Its 12th Five Year Plan (2011-2015), the ‘greenest’ in history 
(Thomson, 2014), has set nation-wide targets to improve energy intensity, carbon intensity, the share 
of non-fossil fuels in the economy, not to mention a series of pilot emissions trading schemes, all 
aimed at reducing its contribution to climate change. The most ambitious target is to improve energy 
intensity, the emissions required to produce GDP, by 16 per cent by 2015. This follows on from its 
previous target in its 11th Five Year Plan to reduce emissions intensity by a staggering 20 per cent, 
which it only narrowly missed, reaching a 19.1 per cent improvement (Leggett, 2011). The same five-
year plan has set targets to reduce the nation’s reliance on coal, which underpins the Chinese energy 
sector. This includes measures to increase gas production and close down old and inefficient coal 
plants (Thomson, 2014, p. 1). Further, in 2013 it announced that it would ban the construction of new 
coal fired power plants in the Beijing, Shanghai and Guandong regions (IEA, 2014, p. 74). The path to 
a domestic emissions trading scheme is being explored through a series of pilot trading schemes. 
These schemes are still in the design phase but ‘they form an important experiment and learning 
opportunity that will shape a potential future national ETS’ (Zhang et al. (2014, p. 15). 
The concrete unilateral actions that we have described are not replacing international coordination 
and in fact may be helping it. The US and China jointly announced new targets for addressing climate 
change ahead of the G20 Summit in 2014, with President Obama committing the US to reduce its 
emissions by 26 to 28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025 and President Xi agreeing, for the first time, 
to peak Chinese emissions by 2030 (Landler, 2014). Yet, as our discussion of regulatory unilateralism 
in the previous section shows, this does not negate the fact that the regulatory measures taken have 
been taken unilaterally.  
The practice of regulatory unilateralism has many dimensions because within modern states 
regulation is much more distributed than centralized. Not to take these levels of regulation into 
account is to miss the true extent of the climate regulatory unilateralism (Grabosky, 1995; Parker, 
2002). For example, hundreds of certification and classification tools relating to the resilience, 
sustainability and efficiency of urban buildings have been developed around the world, the most well 
known being LEED (for a review, see van der Heijden, 2014).  Cities have become hugely important 
actors in addressing climate change with, for example, city authorities in Europe under the Covenant 
of Mayors aiming for a 20% reduction in CO2 emissions by 2020 (Azevedo et al 2013).   
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The economic rationality of unilateralism? 
Free-rider logic appears to make climate unilateralism irrational, risking one’s competitiveness and 
industries.  Is this necessarily true?  Within the trade context reciprocity has been important to the 
process of tariff reduction, with trade negotiators generally arguing against unilateral reductions in 
trade barriers (Garnaut, 2002, p. 159). Yet from 1983 to 2003 unilateral tariff reductions by developing 
countries accounted for 66% of the total share of tariff reduction (World Bank 2005, p. xvi).  Was this 
an outbreak of irrationality?  
Baldwin (2010) in analysing this period of unilateralism draws attention to the role of information 
technology networks in allowing for the coordination of global supply and production chains in which 
the various parts of a product would be made in different countries and then assembled at an optimal 
cost location, very often China.  This production ‘unbundling’ facilitated by information technology 
changes the political economy of protection in developing states.  Once states attract investment in 
the form of production facilities and become exporters of parts and/or final products high protective 
tariffs no longer make sense.  Industrialization that arrives by means of investment erodes the political 
alliances founded during policy periods based on industrialization through domestic protection.  
Unilateral action on tariffs by a country is a way of attracting, keeping or competing for business by 
way of providing the lowest-cost location in global production chains. 
So, as a general point, unilateralism may make economic sense for a country, especially in dynamic 
technology contexts where costs and structures of production are being changed.  That said, there are 
more uncertainties surrounding the economic case for climate regulatory unilateralism.  In the case 
of tariffs, the action required is one of removing a barrier (a case of deregulatory unilateralism) 
whereas with climate unilateralism states can choose from an array of positive actions that include 
market-based carbon trading schemes, carbon taxes, feed-in tariffs, tax concessions, energy efficiency 
standards and encouraging the adoption of voluntary standards in various sectors.   
The economic case for climate regulatory unilateralism has some support in Michael Porter’s (1990) 
theory of competitive advantage.  In setting out the determinants of national competitive advantage 
– factor conditions, demand conditions, related and supporting industries and firm strategy, structure 
and rivalry – Porter argued that governments have a legitimate role to play in shaping the context and 
institutional structure around companies to create an environment that stimulates companies to gain 
competitive advantage (Porter, 1990, p. 87). One role is to implement strict environmental 
regulations. Whereas environmental goals and industrial competitiveness are often viewed as a trade-
off, Porter and Linde (1995, p. 98) showed that ‘properly designed environmental standards can 
trigger innovation’, which not only lowers the cost of complying with the environmental regulations, 
but can also lead to absolute advantages over firms in other countries not subject to the same 
regulations. This is because some firms will innovate in response to regulations by being smarter about 
how to deal with pollution, but more importantly, by simultaneously innovating to improve the 
product and the production process. For example, in Japan in 1991, Hitachi responded to a new 
recycling law by redesigning products to reduce disassembly time. As a result, the number of parts in 
a washing machine fell 16 percent and the number of parts in a vacuum cleaner fell 30 percent (Porter 
and Linde, 1995, pp. 101-102).  
Most importantly, in the context of regulatory unilateralism, the competitive advantage thesis shows 
that when environmental regulations anticipate standards that are likely to globalise, they give a 
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nation’s companies an early mover advantage in international markets. For instance, German firms 
gained an early mover advantage developing less packaging intensive products following the German 
Government’s implementation of recycling standards ahead of many other nations (Porter and Linde, 
1995). With recent forecasts suggesting that renewable energy will account for 50 per cent of installed 
power generation capacity by 2030, up from 28 per cent in 2012, and demand for products that are 
more energy efficient, such as fuel efficient cars on the rise, there are strong economic arguments for 
countries to take a regulatory unilateral approach to climate change (BNEF, 2013). For example, 
China’s renewable energy targets have already led its companies to be world leaders in solar PV 
manufacturing, out competing US and European suppliers (IEA, 2013, p. 211).  
Porter’s arguments concerning competitive advantage have been criticized (Klein, 2001; 
O’Shaugnessy, 2006). However the case studies supporting the theory suggest that broader climate 
regulatory unilateralism may deliver economic benefits.  States still face uncertainties and information 
problems in using regulatory unilateralism as a strategy for building competitive advantage.  
Regulatory unilateralism has to be complemented by, for example, an innovation system that has the 
capability of shifting to new kinds of innovation.  Raising the regulatory bar as a way of stimulating 
environmental innovation in Germany draws on traditions and strengths of German industry, such as 
a highly skilled labour force and a strong commitment to industry-funded research that do not 
necessarily have parallels in other countries. (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 25-26)  Would the same 
strategy for building comparative advantage in environmental innovation work as well in Poland 
where companies do not have the same engineering skills, the patent portfolios or the marketing 
strategies to convince consumers to pay more? Polish policy makers may well come to the view that 
they should steer a different course on environmental regulation, exploiting the price advantages 
conferred by Poland’s domestic coal supplies. Regulatory unilateralism has to be carefully considered 
within a country’s economic context.   
Ultimately, the economic case for climate regulatory unilateralism has to pass some threshold test of 
plausible benefits, but the fact that we are seeing unilateral behaviour within large emitting states 
suggests they perceive some benefits.  Focussing on China, its goal of changing its approach to 
economic growth was formally announced at the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist 
Party of China and given the label of ‘ecological civilization’ (Oswald, 2014).  This change in direction 
is hardly surprising.  Air pollution has become a major killer of Chinese citizens and may well be the 
biggest (UNDP, 2013, p. 30).  China’s five year plans for the environment have not been successful 
with a World Bank (2007) study showing that its 10th five year plan failed to meet 10 out of 13 of its 
goals for reducing air and water pollution.  In a measure of how seriously it is taking environmental 
goals, the central government has been working to improve information transparency in the 
environmental field (Zhang, 2014).  The link between air pollution and the use of coal to generate 
electricity has led to a co-benefit argument in favour of China doing more on reducing its CO2 
emissions (Zheng et al, 2011).  By reducing its use of fossil fuels China would also be reducing the 
emission of other pollutants, especially SO2, thereby gaining measurable short term benefits in terms 
of better air quality and addressing other environmental problems such as acid rain.  
Regulatory unilateralism may also allow China to capture other types of co-benefits.  The 
multinationals that have used China as the final assembly point for many of their products have 
benefited from China’s comparative advantage in a large low cost labour market (Athukorala and 
Yamashita, 2009).  The gains to China of this model have been foreign investment and industrialization 
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albeit with heavy environmental costs.  However, if global production as a value chain is analysed we 
see China’s share of that value chain is small.  It is the owners of Google’s and Microsoft’s intellectual 
property rights that capture most of the economic rents from global production chains (Dedrick et al, 
2010).   
For China climate regulatory unilateralism may be one way in which it can encourage the growth of 
consumption in its internal market.  The basic idea would be to use the Porter logic of setting high 
environmental standards, while investing more in R&D in climate-related technologies.  There is some 
evidence that China is following this strategy, setting regulatory frameworks for low carbon 
technologies such as electric vehicles, a product sector in which it has become the world’s number 
one producer (Watson et al, 2015).   
The core idea of regulatory unilateralism for China is to think broadly and creatively about the co-
benefits of such unilateralism, focusing in particular on the capacity of its vast internal market to 
deliver those benefits. We are not suggesting that regulatory unilateralism would inevitably trigger a 
crossover into a new greener economy, but at the same time we should not be blind to the possibility 
that China could use unilateralism to help it make this great economic crossing. The co-benefit 
argument also applies to India. For both China and India climate regulatory unilateralism offers the 
chance to create internal markets in innovation with all that implies about setting and capturing 
technical standards in the climate sensitive markets of the future. 
Climate unilateralism may also deliver regulatory models that end up diffusing globally, such scale of 
diffusion being a characteristic of regulatory capitalism (Levi-Faur and Jordana, 2005). The unilateral 
construction of a model, if successful, may seduce other nations into the act of regulatory modelling 
(Braithwaite and Drahos, 2002, p. 32).  There is an abundant literature on the spread of emissions 
trading based on its initial success at addressing SO2 emissions in the US (Stavins, 1998) to a worldwide 
phenomenon that has been taken up across the globe, including in China (Jotzo and Löschel, 2014). 
The rationality of unilateral trade liberalization has been defended on the basis of its potential 
modelling effects (Bhagwati, 2002; Garnaut, 2002).  
Our last point concerning the economics of climate unilateralism relates to its trade and market 
integration potential.  For example, Japan is a world leader in the development of climate change 
mitigation technologies (Dechezleprêtre et al, 2011).  A Chinese unilateralism that accelerated the 
absorption of these technologies would benefit both parties and offers the intriguing possibility of a 
green East Asian capitalism.   
Is it geopolitically prudent? 
There is an increasing recognition among policymakers that climate change poses not just economic 
challenges, but serious geopolitical ones as well. In 2014, the US Department of Defence warned that 
climate change will increase the risk of conflicts over water, food and other resources (Department of 
Defense of USA, 2014). Scientific studies suggest that the 2˚C plus world we are heading into will be a 
world of crises. (Stocker et al., 2013). As others have noted, crises have the potential to transform the 
behaviour of states (Zartman, 2003). There is a long list of examples where international crises, such 
as the oil shocks in the 1970s, or financial crises over the decades, have led states to rush to establish 
new rules and institutions, such as the International Energy Agency or new fora for financial 
cooperation such as the G20.  
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It is an open question as to when the increase in the frequency and severity of natural disasters will 
usher in an era of climate mobilization. As the evidence and probability of catastrophic consequences 
of climate change mount each major emitter has an increased incentive to cooperate because without 
that cooperation politically credible action within the domestic sphere to safeguard the security and 
economic interests of a state begin to decline.  The argument for acting unilaterally before this greater 
cooperation point is reached is twofold.   
First if the evidence points to the very survival of states being threatened by the global scale of climate 
change then survival would become a primary motivation of any state so convinced by the evidence. 
It follows that it would be rational to act to bring about cooperation as quickly as possible.  If, as we 
suggested in the previous section, unilateralism holds the potential of triggering modelling effects 
then it becomes geopolitically rational for a state to act in that way.  Saving itself now depends on 
persuading other states to act reciprocally and so any path to encouraging reciprocity becomes 
important.  A second reason for adopting climate regulatory unilateralism lies in the geopolitical 
benefits of being seen as a global leader during times of crisis.  A state that has acted in anticipation 
of crisis has more chance of being followed by other states than being a follower, has more chance of 
being a rule setter rather than a rule taker.  In this position a state has a much better chance of shaping 
global responses to climate interests in ways that attend to its other interests, such as sovereignty and 
domestic stability.   
However, international relations scholars typically argue that unilateralism imposes significant costs 
on states. There are two main arguments that apply in the case of climate change. First, liberal 
institutionalists argue that unilateralism threatens the efficiency gains that can result from 
institutionalised cooperation (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2005, pp. 513-514). This argument has some 
weight in the context of security, but in the case of climate unilateralism we are dealing with actions 
aimed at a reducing rising negative externalities that affect all states. With climate unilateralism a 
state is not undermining the climate regime by doing less than agreed, but rather strengthening it by 
doing more. Unilateralism in the climate context allows a state to be a leader in improving agreed 
standards. Importantly, acting unilaterally does not foreclose on the possibility of a multilateral 
agreement and may be one stepping stone to such an agreement.  
Second, international relations scholars have argued that U.S. unilateralism undermines the legitimacy 
of the liberal international order (Hurd, 2007). Going it alone on climate change, like on other 
significant geopolitical issues, it is argued, undermines the institutions that socialise actors to the 
existing order and leads them to internalise the norms of the system. Yet as Brooks and Wohlforth 
(2005, p. 517) point out ‘some kinds of unilateral actions threaten legitimacy more than others’. And, 
this is precisely the case with climate change. Some unilateral actions may enhance the legitimacy of 
the existing order, especially where they produce public goods consistent with existing international 
norms. Unilateral action has often played a critical role in establishing international environmental 
standards. For example, the threat by the US to unilaterally impose double-hull standards on oil 
tankers entering its ports helped to create the 1973 MARPOL convention and the later Protocol 
(Bodansky, 2000, p. 344). Smaller powers would also be likely to follow to the extent that they are 
convinced that the goals of the US or another major power are worthy in themselves and serve the 
‘greater good’ (Cooper et al., 1991, p. 398). Rather than undermining the legitimacy of a nation, 
regulatory unilateralism on climate change could well enhance its geopolitical standing and that of the 
existing international system.   
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Is it morally justified? 
There is also a moral case for regulatory unilateralism to be considered. The reciprocal negative 
externalities of climate change are progressively coming into focus. We already have estimates that 
climate change is currently causing 150,000 deaths and 5 million incidents of disease each year in 
some of the poorest countries (McMichael et al, 2004). As such, the actions of nations can be 
considered morally in terms of those effects. 
First, unilateral climate measures can be assessed along the same lines that scholars assessed the 
morality of unilateral nuclear disarmament during the Cold War. That is, the human lives lost or saved 
(Lackey, 1985, p. 154). In the 1980s, the dominant view in the US Government was that a nuclear 
arsenal acts as a deterrent against another nation using their weapons: the so-called doctrine of 
mutually assured destruction (Schelling, 1966). As a result, US policymakers argued that unilateral 
nuclear disarmament should not be undertaken because it would have undermined the deterrence of 
nuclear war with the Soviet Union.  However, as many scholars pointed out, this is hard to sustain 
morally. For example, Lackey (1985, p. 154) argued that if one ‘one assumes that human lives lost or 
saved is the principal criterion by which nuclear weapons policies should be measured’ it follows that 
unilateral nuclear disarmament is morally superior because the casualties from a one-sided nuclear 
attack developing under a policy of unilateral disarmament are much less than under a nuclear 
deterrence strategy where both nations employ their nuclear arsenal. Others came to similar 
conclusions (see, for example, Goodin, 1985). 
At a general level, it is the same for climate change. To the extent that a unilateral reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions by any nation reduces the number of deaths and incidence of disease 
caused by climate change it is morally superior to act, than not to. One critique of this position is that 
it assumes that a reduction in emissions would reduce death and disease. And some scholars argue 
this is far from certain. For example, Posner and Sunstein (2008, p. 1575) argue that the effect of one 
or a few nations taking action alone to reduce emissions would be very small given the large existing 
stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. However, this confuses the moral correctness of an 
action with its scale effects.  We do not, for example, question the moral correctness of actions by a 
few brave individuals that have saved only a small number of people from death in concentration 
camps.  Even if unilateral action is only taken by a handful of small nations, which contribute very little 
to changing the finality of climate change, to the extent that it reduces the likelihood of death and 
disease for even one person, then unilateral action must be morally superior to not acting. And, if a 
large state takes action, such as the US or China, which contribute 16 per cent and 28 per cent of 
global greenhouse gas emissions respectively, then the impact on death and disease would be greater 
still. 
Second, unilateral actions could also open up moral pathways to reciprocal action by other nations. 
One way would be to help to promote the development of ‘prohibitionary norms’ that make some 
actions morally unacceptable, such as a national decision not to reduce emissions. Constructivist 
international relations scholars argue that one of the reasons nuclear and chemical weapons are not 
used is because of the odium that has attached to them. Over time particular social and cultural 
meanings became associated with these weapons, which in turn created prohibitionary norms that 
rendered their use unacceptable (see, for example, Price and Tannenwald (1996). Regulatory 
unilateralism, especially by large states, could help to promote similar prohibitionary norms around 
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particular climate change policies, for example, weak emissions targets, a reliance on coal, or rampant 
deforestation. 
Conclusion: toward climate regulatory unilateralism  
As we have seen, the US and China, the world’s two largest emitters, are at the forefront of what we 
have termed regulatory unilateralism. While acknowledging there is some indeterminacy about the 
matter we have suggested that the evidence of regulatory unilateralism point to states beginning a 
process of re-thinking the payoffs of free-riding.  The structure of free-riding in the case of climate 
emissions – reciprocal and reflexive but delayed negative externalities – is consistent with our claim.  
As the negative externalities begin to arrive states start to examine what they can do jointly and where 
they can capture other benefits from moving unilaterally they do so.  On this interpretation of state 
behaviour the Paris Agreement is an important step in climate change negotiations because it is 
encouraging states to do what in the final analysis will be key to meeting the 2 degree goal – a wide 
and rapid array of unilateral actions by states. 
Our analysis has implications for policy makers in a post-Paris world.  First, policymakers need to gain 
a better understanding of the extent and depth of unilateral action being undertaken by all states.  
The Prisoner’s Dilemma has been a dominant framework for analysing climate change, but our 
question is does it capture the real-world dynamics of the problem?  In much the same way that states 
that misread the importance of unilateral tariff liberalization in a world of globalized supply chains 
would also have lost economic opportunities, so a misreading of the extent and importance of climate 
unilateralism will also likely incur opportunity costs. 
Second, policymakers should not read the co-benefits of climate unilateralism narrowly.  As we saw 
with China, there are obvious co-benefits in the form of reduced pollution, but the range of co-benefits 
is much wider than these obvious cases.  While for reasons of space we have only sketched the 
geopolitical and moral justifications for climate unilateralism, it is clear that part of the geopolitical 
case for acting unilaterally comes from preserving the benefits a state has from the existing order and 
avoiding a descent into worst case climate scenarios of survival governance.  Properly understood this 
co-benefit takes the form of preserving existing gains and avoiding losses.   
The correctness of the moral argument for unilateralism is independent of any co-benefits it might 
generate, but worth noting is that moral unilateralism may act as signal to those in the investment 
community who have been persuaded on moral grounds to divest from fossil fuel and invest in 
renewables.  Moral unilateralism in the framework of game theory might be seen as having a sucker’s 
payoff, but the growing transnational influence of the divestment movement (Ayling and Gunningham 
2015) suggests that unilateralism helps to forge a community of like-minded investors looking for 
responsible investment opportunities. 
With regulatory unilateralism we are, as section 2 made clear, dealing with a class of positive actions 
to secure a possibly wide range of benefits.  This does raise the issue of which unilateral acts and their 
linked co-benefits a state should choose.  Clearly, this is a contextual matter.  The choices available to 
small island economies will be different compared to countries with large internal domestic markets, 
such as China or India, or energy importing but export dependent countries, such as South Korea.  
Since the set of feasible choices will be affected by a country’s regulatory and innovation capabilities 
a detailed assessment of those capabilities is required.  In short, climate unilateralism and its co-
12 
 
benefits should be part of national technology mapping and planning exercises.  Countries with large 
or growing car industries, for example, would want to consider the way in which climate unilateralism 
might re-shape their respective industries. 
If we accept that in an ideal world cooperative regulatory multilateralism represents the most 
effective way to address a real world emergency then this suggests that states should choose 
unilateral regulatory measures that open up pathways to reciprocal action while avoiding those that 
limit or jeopardize cooperation. For example, the creation of carbon markets has been a bottom-up 
and often unilateral process (Newell et al 2013) that might lead to the ideal of global carbon market.  
Geo-engineering would on present knowledge be a high-risk unilateral intervention with uncertain 
consequences (Barrett, 2008). 
In this period of the climate change problem the best hope is for states, especially the major emitters 
to conclude that they are not in a Prisoner’s Dilemma, but rather in a period where positive 
unilateralism can help them capture co-benefits of economic reward, geopolitical stability and virtue.  
There is everything to be gained from regulatory unilateralism.  
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